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SINGAPORE: It was not without controversy that Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim appointed former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as a member of his informal advisory team ahead of Malaysia assuming the 2025 chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The decision to bring Thaksin on board was initially seen as a constructive step toward tackling ASEAN’s most pressing challenges - and one that could also strengthen ties between Malaysia and Thailand. Now, three meetings later, it is safe to say that those expectations were misplaced.

Anwar first met Thaksin in his capacity as an adviser aboard a luxury yacht near Thailand’s Koh Lipe in late December 2024, to discuss bilateral relations, the conflict in Thailand’s Deep South, and the Myanmar crisis. A month later, they met again in Kuala Lumpur to revisit Myanmar issues, alongside discussions on an ASEAN-led cryptocurrency framework.

During their February audience with Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, an already muddled laundry list expanded to include scam operations along Thailand’s borders and disputes in the South China Sea.

It is possible that Anwar saw in Thaksin a means to navigate some of these challenges - one grounded in decades of international business dealings and personal ties to key Southeast Asian strongmen, including Hun Sen, Cambodia’s former prime minister and current president of the Senate, and Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. These networks may open doors, particularly in Myanmar, where formal bureaucratic channels have struggled to make headway.

Access to Thaksin also means a direct line to the key figures shaping the immediate contours of Thailand’s foreign policy - his daughter, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, and Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, a loyalist and longtime personal aide of Thaksin. Both take their cues from him.

In theory, keeping Thaksin close could help to keep Thailand in sync with ASEAN, particularly on Myanmar issues, where Thailand has a history of going rogue in contradiction to agreements reached by ASEAN member states.

MORE LIABILITY THAN ASSET?

But Thaksin could prove to be more of a liability than an asset, given his own entanglement in some of the very issues he was brought in to help resolve and, more broadly, the political baggage he carries as Thailand’s most polarising figure.

On Myanmar, Thaksin’s failed attempt to broker peace in May 2024 offers little reason to expect a different outcome now, even if the State Administration Council (SAC) finds itself losing chunks of territory by the day. Just like then, his perceived ties to Min Aung Hlaing is likely to put off any anti-junta groups expecting a neutral arbiter, while his actual ties may not be strong enough to bring the SAC to a table of equals.

Furthermore, Thaksin’s ambiguous status - somewhere between a shadow prime minister and a freshly pardoned convict still facing a pending lese-majeste charge - could undermine his own efforts and compromise Thailand’s position.

As before, the Thai government cannot formally endorse his diplomatic overtures. This leaves Thaksin without the credibility and legitimacy of official state backing needed to secure any lasting agreement. At the same time, the Thai government’s failure to shake off the broader impression that it is acting under his influence could sow confusion about who truly speaks for Thailand’s policy towards Myanmar.

Whether his diplomatic engagement is guided by his own personal interests, Thailand’s priorities or ASEAN’s, what Thaksin does will reflect on the Thai government - and now also Anwar - leaving them to manage the fallout and clean up any messes he leaves behind.

AN UNNECESSARY COMPLICATION

Some may argue that Thaksin’s role is ultimately secondary and purely advisory, with Anwar under no obligation to act on his counsel - and that Malaysia, as ASEAN chair, will be leading the effort to resolve the Myanmar crisis.

This may be true, but even in this scenario, involving Thaksin sends mixed signals: It raises questions about whether ASEAN remains committed to a coordinated approach to Myanmar or is instead pivoting toward a more informal, personality-driven strategy subject to the whims of individual leaders like Thaksin.

Thaksin is, in short, an unnecessary complication that clouds ASEAN’s position at a time when it needs a clear and unified stance on the crisis in Myanmar.

On resolving the conflicts near the Thai-Malaysian border, Thaksin’s record in the Deep South speaks for itself. He is best remembered for dismissing insurgents as “petty criminals” and acting on flawed intelligence during his tenure as prime minister, leading to a series of hardline policies that sharply escalated tensions between insurgent groups and the kingdom’s security forces.

In October 2024, under his daughter’s government, the statute of limitations expired for those responsible for the Tak Bai massacre, allowing them to walk free without accountability. Four months later, in a historic visit to Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, Thaksin apologised for his past actions, but his words may ring hollow as long as his daughter’s government makes no effort to seek justice for the victims’ families.

RISK OF ERODING MALAYSIA’S CREDIBILITY

If Anwar’s plan is for Malaysia to play a more active role in mediating peace talks in Thailand’s Deep South, involving or associating with Thaksin is not just ill-advised - it risks further eroding Malaysia’s credibility in a process where its neutrality is already questionable to begin with.

Some analysts note that Malaysia has nothing to lose from a low-intensity conflict: It prevents Thailand from exerting full control of the Deep South, while avoiding the direct spillover of refugees heading southward into Malaysia.

The Anwar-Thaksin deal only makes sense for Thaksin: It gives him a way back into regional diplomacy and a chance to rehabilitate his image after forging a toxic alliance that tarnished his political brand. Most importantly, the deal provides Thaksin a convenient excuse to get court approval to travel abroad if things go south back home.

Napon Jatusripitak is a Visiting Fellow and Acting Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary on the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute's blog, Fulcrum.